

own data, can communicate with each other and even compare one another's data. But he does not go into the question; it is a matter for the psychologist and not for the metaphysician.

On this view valuation is clearly subjective. Consciousness imputes value to data. Values are either intrinsic or instrumental. Prof. Stace is concerned to show that the subjectivity of all values does not prevent some values from being normative. This he does by means of his conception of welfare. Every cell desires its own welfare; and to value a datum in a particular way carries with it the belief that this valuation will contribute to the welfare of the cell. What welfare is, he confesses himself unable to define, just as Socrates confessed himself unable to give an account of the good. The cell is bound by the laws of its own nature, and the belief that a particular valuation will contribute to the welfare of the cell may turn out to be mistaken. In so far as cells have the same general characteristics, the same valuations attributing intrinsic value will be found to contribute to, or be inimical to, their welfare, and in so far as this is the case we may say that they ought to value in certain ways. It is in this sense that he speaks of certain values as normative. All this applies to moral and æsthetic values. His theory requires that the normative values of different works of art, as works of art, are to be determined in terms of their importance for human welfare. Truth he does not regard as a normative value at all; he holds that the only ground we could have for arguing that people ought to acquire knowledge of certain sorts would be that of the instrumental value of that knowledge. The contrast he draws between knowledge and beauty depends, I think, on his concentrating on particular propositions and particular fields of knowledge for his discussion of knowledge, while for his discussion of beauty he is content to deal in generalities.

The last chapter deals with knowledge of God. He argues that it is wrong to reproach a philosopher for making God a *deus ex machina* to solve difficulties otherwise insoluble, for if God is to be reached by way of a philosophical hypothesis, this is the proper and legitimate way of doing it. His own theory of cells he insists has no need of any such *deus*. But he thinks it possible to accept the claim of the religious mystics to have a direct experience of God, so that there is in their case a consciousness of data falling within the divine cell. I have already touched on this conception.

The book is well written and well planned. It contains many interesting discussions of important topics, with much good sense.

L. J. RUSSELL.

*Philosophical and Literary Pieces.* By SAMUEL ALEXANDER. Edited, with a Memoir, by his Literary Executor. London: Macmillan & Co., 1939. Pp. viii + 300. 15s.

ALEXANDER died at Manchester on 13th Sept., 1938, in his eightieth year, mercifully spared from the wrath which was so soon to come upon his country and his city. In this book his literary executor, Prof. Laird, has reprinted fourteen of his philosophical and literary pieces; has prefixed to them a memoir of nearly one hundred pages; and has supplied occasional notes and a full bibliography of all but the most ephemeral of Alexander's publications. The name of the Editor is an ample guarantee of the thoroughness and conscientiousness of the work.

In the Preface Prof. Laird explains the principles on which, after consultation with Alexander, he chose the pieces to be published. One only

of them, the essay in *The Cornhill* on "The Mind of a Dog", dates back to the period before the first war between England and Germany; the rest belong to the twenties and the early thirties of the present century.

The Memoir gives a very attractive and informative account of an exceptionally lovable and beloved personality. It contains a short fragment of autobiography.

The papers reprinted fall into six classes. First comes a single essay in a class by itself, viz. a psychological biography of Alexander's dog "Griff". We learn from the Memoir that the dog's name was derived from the Hegelian "Begriff", and that the essay is unduly flattering to the animal's virtue and intelligence. If McTaggart had written an essay on his cat, I suspect that it would have suffered from the same amiable defect. Next come four literary papers, viz. "Dr. Johnson as a Philosopher", "The Art of Jane Austen", "Molière and Life", and "Pascal the Writer". (The last of these contains almost as much about the poetry of Robert Bridges as about the writings of Pascal. It also contains the startling statement that "the word 'Ditcher' is used in German for any imaginative writer".) The next three essays are concerned with aesthetics, a subject to which Alexander devoted much thought in his last years. They are entitled "Art and the Material", "Art and Instinct", and "Artistic Creation and Cosmic Creation". Then follow two papers on value, viz. "Naturalism and Value" and "Value". To these succeed two on theological topics, viz. "Natural Piety" and "Theism and Pantheism". The last two essays are concerned with Spinoza. One is a lecture in honour of the tercentenary of his birth; the other is the celebrated paper on "Spinoza and Time".

The literary pieces are full of well-chosen quotations, and make very pleasant reading. They must have made even pleasanter hearing when Alexander delivered them as lectures and read the quotations aloud in his beautiful voice. The contributions to aesthetics, value-theory, theology and Spinozistic lore have all, I think, been published before. I must confess that I find aesthetics so boring, and suspect it to be so largely bogus, that I feel precluded from passing any fair judgments on philosophic writings about it. The remaining essays, except "Spinoza and Time", are rather slight performances. Apart from the lecture in honour of Spinoza's tercentenary, they are on topics which Alexander had treated elaborately in "Space, Time, and Deity". So far as I can see, they add nothing of importance to the corresponding parts of that work, and do little to clear up the difficulties and obscurities with which it abounds. The essay on "Spinoza and Time" is of considerable interest, both to students of Spinoza and to those of Alexander, and it is a great convenience to have it reprinted.

C. D. BROAD.

*Theory of Probability.* By HAROLD JEFFREYS. Oxford: at the Clarendon Press, 1939. Pp. viii + 380. 21s.

IN a series of works published since 1919 (the earlier ones in collaboration with Dr. Dorothy Wrinch) Dr. Jeffreys has developed a theory of probability as the measure of degree of reasonable belief on lines fairly similar to those of J. M. Keynes's *Treatise on Probability* (1921). In *Theory of Probability* Jeffreys explains how his probability theory can be applied to the technique of modern statistics; and the greater part of this mathe-